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THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES CREDIT REGULATIONS:
HOW THEY AFFECT FOREIGN BORROWERS AND FOREIGN
LENDERS IN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S. COMPANIES
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1. Introduction
In the United States, credit is extensively regulated by a complex set of rules
that affect both domestic and foreign borrowers and lenders in the acquisition
of exchange-listed and certain other actively traded, publicly-held equity
securities of U.S. companies. Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Securities Exchange Act) [1] authorizes the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to
set limits on the amount of credit that may be extended in connection with
securities transactions. Accordingly, the FRB has established 'requirements
specifying the amount of collateral security, or "margin", that must be provided when the purchase of such publicly-held securities is financed. The rules
currently provide that broker-dealers, banks, and other lenders may not extend
or arrange credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying such securities in
excess of 50% of the market value of the publicly held securities (plus, in the
case of banks and non-broker-dealer lenders, other collateral) used to secure
such credits.
Recent amendments to the regulations (the 1982 FRB amendments) [2] will
have a significant effect on foreign lenders and foreign borrowers comtemplating the acquisition of U.S. companies. If legislation passed by the House of
Representatives and now pending in the Senate is enacted, there will be even
greater regulation of foreign borrowers and lenders. This article analyzes the
application of the credit regulations, as modified by the 1982 FRB amendments, to these entities, discusses the pending legislation and identifies the
consequences of non-compliance.
1.1. Purpose of margin requirements
The FRB margin provisions are intended to serve several functions. The
primary purpose is to protect the economy of the United States by preventing
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the excessive use of credit resources for securities speculation. In initially
adopting the credit restrictions in 1934, Congress believed such speculation
caused unreasonable expansion, followed by unreasonable contraction, of the
volume of credit available for trade, transportation, and commerce. Secondary
purposes of the margin regulations are preventing instability in securities
markets and protecting small investors from becoming "sheared lambs" through
dangerous speculation [3].
1.2. Applicability to acquisitionfinancing
Both the FRB, which makes and interprets the margin rgulations, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which enforces them (primarily
against broker-dealers), take the position that acquisition financing is subject
to the margin regulations even if the securities will no longer be publicly held
after the acquisition [4]. For purposes of this article, the term "acquisition
financing" means any debt financing that is used to purchase or carry a
substantial amount of publicly-held equity securities whether the purchase
involves a tender offer, cash merger, or other acquisition technique.

2. Regulations T, U, and G
The lending and credit arranging activities of broker-dealers are governed
by Regulation T; banks, by Regulation U; and other lenders (G-lenders),
principally insurance companies, by Regulation G [5].
The basis of the regulations is a concern with "purpose credit" secured by
"margin securities". Purpose credit, or a "purpose loan", is credit or a loan
extended or arranged in order to purchase or carry margin securities for any
purpose including acquisition financing. Margin securities are, essentially,
securities listed on a national securities exchange or FRB approved stocks
actively traded in the over-the-counter market [6].
Under Regulation T, broker-dealers are prohibited from extending purpose
credit unless such credit is secured by margin securities and then only in
amounts permitted by the regulation [7]. A broker-dealer is therefore prohibited from making unsecured (or under-secured) purpose loans and from
making purpose loans secured by non-margin stock.
Under Regulation U and Regulation G, banks and G-lenders are subject to
credit restrictions only if purpose credit is extended and secured by margin
stock [8]. Unlike brokers, therefore, banks and G-lenders can make both
unsecured purpose loans and purpose loans secured by non-margin stock.
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3. Regulation X
Regulation X [9] restricts borrowers who are U.S. persons or controlled by
U.S. persons from obtaining credit within or outside the United States, except
in compliance with Regulations T, U, or G.
In 1969-70, the SEC, among others, became concerned with the use of
funds borrowed from foreign lenders for the purpose of taking over control of
registered U.S. companies. Such use was the principal issue in Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp. [10], which involved a foreign financed
takeover attempt of MGM. In denying an injunction against the takeover, the
court held that neither Regulation T nor Regulation G was applicable to
foreign lending institutions. This decision heightened the concern with such
borrowing and led to the addition of section 7(f) to the Securities Exchange
Act in 1970 [11] and the adoption of Regulation X by the FRB. Section 7(f)
and Regulation X deal with foreign-based acquisition financing by regulating
the borrower rather than the lender. Section 7(f) forbids the use of credit, no
matter where obtained, by a citizen or resident of the United States or one
involved with such a person, for the purpose of (a) purchasing any United
States securities or (b) purchasing any securities within the United States, if the
transaction by which such credit was obtained would have been prohibited had
it occurred within the United States.
Under Regulation X, if credit to purchase or carry securities is obtained
abroad by a U.S. person from a foreign lender not subject to Regulations G, T,
or U, then the borrower is required to conform with the credit limitations in
Regulation G as though the lender were subject to that Regulation [12]. The
indirect effect of Regulation X on a foreign lender is that any purpose loan
extended in connection with acquisition financing to a U.S. person or a foreign
person controlled by a U.S. person or acting on behalf of or in conjunction
with such a person and secured by margin stock is subject to the Regulation G
margin restrictions in effect at that time [13].
3.1. Indirectly secured credit
Even though a direct pledge of margin securities is not made to a lender, a
purpose credit cannot be indirectly secured by margin securities in excess of
the applicable credit limitations. The FRB defines the term "indirectly secured"
to include any arrangement under which stock is more readily available as
security to a lender than to other creditors [14J, and any arrangement under
which the borrower's right or ability to sell, pledge, or otherwise dispose of
such stock is in any way restricted (so-called negative pledge covenants) [15].
Therefore, even though not directly pledged to a lender, stock can be indirectly
securing a loan if by custody arrangements or loan covenants the lender could
have preferential access to the stock.
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An excepton to the indirectly secured classification occurs when a lender in
good faith has not relied upon the stock as collateral in making the loan. The
Board has interpreted this good faith exception to be available when (i) a loan
has fixed maturity dates rather than being payable on demand or in the event
of market fluctuations, and (ii) the lender has examined financial statements of
the borrower that can reasonably be interpreted to support the loan [16].
3.2. Persons covered
Regulation X regulates purpose credit extended to U.S. persons, including
(i) foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents and (ii) U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
parents, even if made by a foreign lender.
Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents are covered since the phrase "a foreign
person controlled by a U.S. person" is defined to include any corporation in
which a U.S. person owns more than 50% of voting control or share value [17].
Moreover, when a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign borrower is organized for the
purpose of effecting the acquisition (which is a common method used in such
transactions), then the participation by the U.S. subsidiary in the acquisition
would cause the foreign borrower of a purpose loan secured by margin
securities to be deemed "acting on behalf of or in conjunction with a U.S.
person" [18] and would cause the loan to be subject to the credit regulations.
Although not wholly free from doubt, it does not appear that foreign
lenders making purpose loans to foreign borrowers are directly subject to
Regulation G [19]. In the only case to consider the issue, it was held that
Regulation G does not apply directly to foreign lenders [20]. Moreover, the
argument for coverage is perhaps also undercut by the congressional perception that coverage of such transactions requires a further amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act [21].
In a letter dated July 3, 1980 [22], the FRB staff expressed its opinion with
respect to the applicability of Regulations G, U, and X to a tender offer for the
stock of a U.S. corporation by a Canadian corporation that had several U.S.
subsidiaries. The tender offer was to be financed by a Canadian bank that had
branches and agencies in the United States and was to be collateralized by the
target margin stock. All the activities relating to arranging and extending the
credit, however, were to be done in Canada. The opinion stated that the
margin regulations would not apply. It concluded that Regulation X would not
apply unless the acquired corporation were to be merged into one of the U.S.
subsidiaries of the Canadian corporation. Regulation U was considered inapplicable because all the activities connected with the credit would occur outside
the United States (the sole exception being that the U.S. branch of the
Canadian bank would act as a depository for the shares tendered). Regulation
G was deemed inapplicable unless Regulation X applied to the borrower.
Regulation U applies only to a bank as defined in section 3(a) (6) of the
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Securities Exchange Act. That definition, by its terms, excludes foreign banks
[23]. If a foreign bank maintains a branch or agency in the United States that
is supervised by state or federal banking authorities, it would literally fall
within the definition and, therefore, within Regulation U. The July 3, 1980,
staff opinion [24], however, indicates that so long as the foreign bank's head
office (or other non-U.S. branch of the foreign bank) extends the credit and
conducts all activities connected with arranging the extension of the credit
outside the United States, Regulation U would not be applicable. If the credit
is extended in the United States or to a U.S. person, such as a U.S. subsidiary
of a foreign borrower, it would appear, although there is no staff or Board
interpretation directly on point, that Regulation U would be applicable to a
foreign bank that maintains a U.S. branch or agency [25].

4. The 1982 FRB amendments
These amendments, which became effective on February 15 and March 31,
1982 [26], made four significant changes. None of the changes was specifically
directed toward foreign borrowers or lenders, but all have impact on foreign
persons.
4.1. Broker-dealers
Formerly, broker-dealers could arrange debt financing with other lenders
only on terms and conditions that would be permissible under Regulation T if
the broker were directly extending the loan even though the terms of the loan
otherwise complied with either Regulation U or Regulation G. A purpose loan
is "arranged" by a broker-dealer when it is initiated or negotiated by the
broker-dealer or when the broker-dealer acts as intermediary between the
borrower and the lender. This rule allowed a broker-dealer to arrange a credit
only if the proceeds were not used to purchase publicly-held securities or if the
credit fully complied with the Regulation T restrictions on broker-dealers.
Under the 1982 FRB amendments, a broker-dealer is able to arrange
financing without imposing such restrictions even if the proceeds are used to
purchase margin securities, so long as the arranged loan otherwise complies
with the credit regulations [27]. This amendment is particularly important for
the United States investment banking community which was formerly impeded
in its ability to participate in arranging acquisition financing [28]. It has
significance for foreign persons as well, since the principal reason a foreign
transaction prior to the 1982 FRB amendments was likely to be subject to, or
prohibited by, the margin restrictions was due to the involvement of a
broker-dealer in the credit. Now, broker-dealers are expected to be actively
involved in promoting foreign participation in acquisition financing.
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4.2. Banks
Formerly, Regulation G applied only to purpose loans secured by margin
securities, whereas Regulation U applied to purpose loans secured by any
stock. Regulation U was amended, among other things, to substitute the term
"margin stock" where the term "stock" previously appeared throughout the
Regulation, thus limiting the application of Regulation U to margin stock
collateral only [29]. As a consequence, the principal difference that previously
existed between banks and G-lenders has been removed. Moreover, the stock
of subsidiaries and other non-margin stock of a borrower may now be pledged
or restricted by negative pledge covenants in bank loan agreements for purpose
credit without limitation under Regulation U.
4.3. G-lenders
Regulation 0 was amended to permit G-lenders to extend credit secured by
assets other than margin securities concurrently with the extension of regulated
purpose credit [30]. Previously, G-lenders were prohibited from extending
regulated loans and non-purpose loans to the same borrower if the non-purpose loan was over $5,000 and both loans were secured (or deemed secured) by
the same margin securities.
Equally significant, G-lenders are now treated comparably with banks in
terms of being able to ascribe loan value to collateral other than margin
securities [31]. As a general proposition both before and after these amendments, regulated loans by either banks or G-lenders cannot exceed the loan
value of the collateral. For margin stock, loan value equals 50% of market
value. Prior to the amendment, however, banks could value both margin stock
collateral and non-margin stock collateral, whereas G-lenders could value only
the margin securities. Consequently, the same loan to the same borrower,
collateralized by both margin stock and non-margin stock, may have been
lawful for the bank but unlawful for the G-lender. For example, a $1,000 loan
from a bank secured by margin stock having a market value of $1,000 (and,
therefore, a loan value of $500) and other assets valued in good faith at $500
was permissible under Regulation U and impermissible under Regulation G
because the G-lender could ascribe no value to the other assets. Now such a
loan would be permissible for both types of lenders.
4.4. Indirectly secured credit
Finally, the definition of indirectly secured was amended to quantify the
amount of a borrower's assets that may comprise margin securities without
triggering Regulation U and G restrictions on loans deemed indirectly secured
by margin securities [32]. A negative pledge covenant will not result in
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indirectly securing a loan if, following application of the proceeds of the credit,
not more than 25% of the value of the borrower's assets consists of margin
stock.
The amendment also clarified the use of cross-default provisions in loan
agreements. Cross-default provisions create a default under one loan agreement if an event of default has occurred under a different loan agreement.
Previously it was unclear when a cross-default provision would result in a loan
deemed to be indirectly secured by margin stock. The amendment expressly
states that a cross-default provision will not cause a loan agreement to be
deemed indirectly secured by margin securities even though another lender has
made a loan to the same borrower secured by margin stock, so long as the
lenders are unaffiliated [33].
The effect of all these amendments is to rationalize, in large part, the rules
and to achieve parity in regulations among broker-dealers, banks, and Glenders. To the extent foreign lenders remain indirectly subject to U.S. margin
regulations through Regulation X, they are beneficiaries of these policies.
Sensitivity to credit requirements continues to be required, however, and it will
be of even greater significance in the event of the passage of pending
legislation on uniform margin requirements.

5. Pending legislation - uniform margin requirements
Principally in reaction to several well-publicized tender offers for U.S.
corporations in 1980 and 1981 [34], several bills were proposed in the Senate
and the House of Representatives to regulate and restrict the ability of foreign
borrowers to obtain margin credit. On October 13, 1981, H.R. 4145 was
approved by the House of Representatives and is presently pending before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs [35]. The legislation as passed by the House of Representatives was intended to put non-United
States persons on an equal credit footing with United States persons in
transactions involving the acquisition of securities of United States companies
and to specify a private right of action for violation of the margin requirements
in certain circumstances.
Under the proposed legislation, section 7(f) of the Securities Exchange Act
would be amended so that it is unlawful for "any person" (not just any U.S.
person or a person controlled by or acting in conjunction with a U.S. person)
to obtain purpose credit, even from a foreign lender, in excess of the credit
restrictions applicable were the loan made completely in the United States. The
foreign lender is not directly restricted by the proposed amendment, although
to the extent it facilitates a violation by a borrower, the foreign lender would,
of course, be subject to an allegation that it is an aider and abettor.
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5.1. Effect of non-compliance
Compliance with the securities credit regulations is significant to all lenders,
including foreign lenders, since non-compliance could result in rendering a
loan contract unenforceable. Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
provides that each contract made in violation of the Act is voidable at the
option of an innocent party to the loan [36]. Sophisticated corporate borrowers
would have difficulty in establishing innocence in this context, but even the
possibility of a loan being rescinded by the corporate borrower (or by a trustee
in bankruptcy in the event of the insolvency of the borrowers) is disquieting.
Foreign lenders, per se, are not directly regulated by the margin regulations;
but clearly they become indirectly implicated by virtue of Regulation X. A
foreign lender that extends credit to a Regulation X borrower in excess of that
permissible may well be deemed an aider and abettor of the Regulation X
violator and may, therefore, be subject to an action by an innocent party under
section 29(b). Indeed, in United States v. Weisscredit Banca Commerciale e
D'Investmenti [37], the court, in denying a motion by a foreign bank to dismiss
a criminal indictment, held that a foreign bank acting as an alleged brokerdealer may be found to be an aider and abettor in a margin violation by a U.S.
broker-dealer, even though the foreign bank was not transacting business in
securities in the United States and even though it had no "fair warning" from
the U.S. government that the margin regulations extended to foreign banks.
Exposure to such liability is not often fully appreciated by foreign lenders [38].
5.2. Private right of action
Generally, recent case law has not favored a private right of action under
section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act. The legislative history of H.R. 4145
indicates that the House Committee recognized that previous holdings granting
a private right of action under section 7 were being increasingly called into
question and that the only rights of action clearly available involve violations
of the tender offer provisions of the Securities Exchange Act [39].
A new subsection (g) to be added to section 7 of the Securities Exchange
Act is proposed by the pending legislation. It would provide that the issuer of
securities purchased in violation of the margin requirements and any other
person who is injured or threatened with injury by reason of a violation thereof
may bring a private action if the acquisition involves (a) 5% or more of any
class of equity securities or (b) a tender offer for any class of equity securities
that results in such person being directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 5% of any class of equity securities. An action under this section
would have to be brought within one year after discovery of the facts
constituting the violation or three years after the occurrence of the last
substantial element of the violation [40].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol4/iss3/5

R.J. Garets. J. W. Jakubik / U.S. securitiescredit regulations

The remedy provided by the new legislation would require, therefore, that
greater attention be directed toward compliance with the margin credit regulations, since it would clearly create a private right of action. In the context of a
contested tender offer, it would substantially increase the ability of the target
company or a competing tender offeror to allege violations of the margin
regulations by foreign borrowers and foreign lenders, and it would significantly
expand their exposure to litigation in the United States. The Committee report,
moreover, indicated that the right recognized in subsection (g) is not intended
to impair any other implied right a party may have under the Securities
Exchange Act.

6. Conclusion
The FRB is conducting a review of the margin regulations, and it is difficult
to predict whether changes resulting from such review will lessen the attention
that presently must be paid. Certainly if the proposed legislation discussed
above is enacted, the credit rules will be of greater concern to foreign
borrowers and lenders. It is unlikely, however, regardless of any revisions, that
the restrictions will ever be completely eliminated in the context of acquisition
financing [41].
It will continue to be imperative that a full analysis be made of the effects of
the credit restrictions and whether the anticipated financing structure used in
the acquisition is appropriate. Inadvertant mistakes in this area - where hostile
challenges are likely and microscopic scrutiny is inevitable - can cause severe
and perhaps irremediable consequences. Only a strict compliance program and
carefully drafted loan documentation will be able to withstand allegations
necessitating a full factual inquiry into the circumstances under which the
financing of the acquisition occurred.
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Notes
[1] 15 U.S.C. §78g (1976). The Securities Exchange Act includes a variety of provisions
governing the trading of publicly-held securities and regulating broker-dealers.
[2] 47 Fed. Reg. 2981 (1982).
[3] House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Uniform Margin Requirements, H.R. Rep.
No. 258, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1981).
[4] See 12 CFR §221.110; letters to the district court from the SEC and the FRB attached as
Appendices G and H to the decision set forth in Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp.
199, 251-56 (D. Md.), aff'dper curiam, 546 F. 2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976). The FRB's expressed policy,
as stated in its opinion dated November 29, 1979, reprintedin 35 Business Lawyer 570-71 (1980),
is that the date the financing commitment is made (not the funding of the loan) determines the
publicly-held status of the securities to be acquired. This policy may be changed, however, in light
of the FRB's current reconsideration of the margin regulations.
[5] Regulation T - 12 CFR §220; Regulation U - 12 CFR §221; and Regulation G - 12 CFR
§ 207.
[6] The term "purpose credit" is defined at 12 CFR §221.3 (b), 12 CFR §207.1 (c), and 12 CFR
§224.5 (j); and the term "margin securities" (or margin stock) is defined at 12 CFR §220.2 (f), 12
CFR §221.3 (v), 12 CFR §207.2 (d), and 12 CFR §224.5 (h). Margin securities also include debt
securities convertible into or carrying a right to purchase a margin security, a warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase a margin security, and a security issued by an investment company unless
at least 95% of its assets are invested in exempted securities. To "carry" a security is to refinance
an existing purpose credit. 12 CFR §221.3 (b) (2).
[71 12 CFR §220.3 (c); 12 CFR §220.8 (a).
[8] 12 CFR §221.1 (a); 12 CFR §207.1 (c). The 1982 FRR amendments, see infra text
accompanying notes 26-33, place banks and G-lenders in parity in this regard by amending
Regulation U to trigger its applicability only when purpose loans are secured by margin stock.
Regulation U previously applied if such loans were secured by any stock.
[9] 12 CFR §224.
[10] 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
[11] 15 U.S.C. §78g (f) (1976).
[12] 12 CFR § 224.2 (b) (iv). A foreign lender means any person, other than a United States
person, who in the ordinary course of its business extends, maintains, or arranges purpose credit
outside the United States. Id.
[13] The impact of this result has been ameliorated by the 1982 FRB amendments, which now
permit G-lenders to ascribe loan value to collateral other than margin securities. See infra text
accompanying note 31. Prior to the adoption of the 1982 FRB amendments, a similar but more
restrictive result would have occurred had the loan been arranged by a broker-dealer. If a
broker-dealer subject to Regulation T arranged a purpose loan from a foreign lender to a U.S.
borrower, the credit transaction would have been required to comply with the more severe credit
restrictions of Regulaton T applicable to direct broker-dealer loans. Under the present rules,
however, only the restrictions of Regulation G are applicable in such circumstances, even to
broker-dealer-arranged credits.
[14] 12 CFR §221.113 (e).
[15] The 1982 FRB amendments revised both Regulations U and G to limit restrictions on
negative pledge covenants to margin stock, rather than any stock, and quantified the amount of a
borrower's assets that may consist of margin securities. 12 CFR §221.3 (c); and 12 CFR §207.2 (i).
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(16] 12 CFR §221.117 (b). See also Alaska Interstate Company v. McMillian. 402 F. Supp. 532
(D. Del. 1975). The FRB has also suggested factors that would support a conclusion that a loan is
indirectly secured by stock. Cf. 12 CFR §221.113 (g). See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the clarification of indirect security made by the 1982 FRB amendments.
1171 Securities Exchange Act §7 (f) (2) (C). 15 U.S.C. §78g (1) (2) (C) (1976).
[18] 12 CFR §224.5 (a). This term includes a direct beneficial interest by the borrower in the
securities of an acquiring subsidiary or in the income or gains or losses of the acquiring subsidiary.
[191 The argument for coverage by Regulation G finds support in a line of cases rebutting the
usual presumption against extraterritoriality when actions outside the United States have substantial impact on the U.S. securities markets. See, e.g.. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. 405 F. 2d 200,
206-08 (2d Cir. 1968).
[20] Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corporation. 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). It should be noted that this case was decided prior to the addition of section 7 (f) to the
Securities Exchange Act.
[21] See infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
[22] Federal Reserve Board, Securities Credit Transactions Handbook, 15-984.
[23] Section 3 (a) (6) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78c (a) (6) (1976), provides:
The term "bank" means (A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States.
(B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution, whether
incorporatedor not, doing business underthe lais of any State or of the United States, a substantial
portion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers
similar to those permitted to national banks under section 11 (k) of the Federal Reserve Act, as
amended, and which is supervised and examined by State or Federal authority having supervision
over banks, and which is not operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of this title, and
(D) a receiver, conservator, or other liquidating agent of any institution or firm included in clauses
(A). (B). or (C) of this paragraph. (Emphasis added.)
[241 Supra note 22.
[25] If the foreign bank does not maintain a U.S. branch or agency and the credit involves a
U.S. person, the credit must comply with the provisions of Regulation G by reason of Regulation
X. The bank in such circumstances would not fall within the definition of bank in section 3 (a) (6)
of the Act. However, because of the 1982 FRB amendments discussed infra. this technical
distinction is presently not substantive.
[26] 47 Fed. Reg. 2981 (1982). At this writing, additional amendments to Regulation T are
under consideration, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,376 (1982). However, the authors do not believe such
amendments will affect acquisition financing.
[27] 12 CFR §220.7 (a) (1982).
[28] This was particularly so in the context of leveraged buyouts, which were further inhibited
by the FRB opinion of November 29, 1979, supra note 4. The result of that opinion was a major
restructuring of certain of these transactions and the abandonment of others.
[291 12 CFR §221.1 (a). (b), (c); 12 CFR §221.3 (a), (in). (p), (q), (r) (2). (s). (t) (4); 12 CFR
§221.4 (a), (c) (1982).
[30] 12 CFR §207.1 (h) (1982).
[31] Compare 12 CFR §207.1 (i) (1982) with 12 CFR §221.3 (s) (1981).
[32] 12 CFR §207.2 (i) (1982); 12 CFR §221.3 (c) (1982).
[33] 12 CFR §221.3 (c) (2) (1982); 12 CFR §207.2 (i) (2) (1982).
[34] The tender offers that principally caused Congressional concern were offers for Zale
Corp.. Hobart Corporation, and Bache & Co. by Canadian firms. The Canadian acquisitions were
particularly sensitive because of the Canadian government's policy under the Canadian Foreign
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Investment Review Act and The National Energy Program that restricted non-Canadian ownership
in Canada. See H.R. Rep. No. 258, supra note 3, at 3-6.
[35] 127 Cong. Rec. H7210 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1981), SI1423 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1981).
[36] Securities Exchange Act §29 (b), 15 U.S.C. 78cc (b) (1976), states:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, and every contract... the performance of which involves the violation of, or the
continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void....
[37] 325 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
[38] Foreign appreciation of the reality of the application of the U.S. credit regulations and the
concomitant exposure to lawsuits has been succinctly explained by one of the author's Swiss
colleagues as follows:
A typical example of the difference in viewpoints is the non-U.S. opinion concerning the margin
requirements. For European bankers, statutory rules which tell them how much credit they are
allowed to advance against the pledge of securities constitute a severe infringement on their
commercial liberties. They are convinced that they are in the best position to judge what is a
reasonable percentage, and they do it at their own risk. Furthermore, the notion that someone can
sue his banker because the banker gave him too much credit is considered to be absurd.
Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws - Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to M essrs. Loonis and
Grant), I J. Comp. Corp. L & See. Reg. 39, 40 (1978). Peter Widmer is a member of the Zurich bar
and of Baker & McKenzie.
[39] Securities Exchange Act §14 (d), (e), 15 U.S.C. 78n (d), (e) (1976). See H.R. Rep. No. 258,
supra note 3, at 9-10. In Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp.. 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.) affdper
curiamz, 546 F. 2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976); however, the district court held that the target company could
assert a private action against a broker-dealer for its violation of Regulation T in arranging the
acquisition financing in that case. Although not required for its decision, the court also suggested
that the target company would have standing to sue the acquiring company for its violation of
section 7(f) of the Securities Exchange Act and Regulation X. But see, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Del Valle, 528 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Fla. 1981), and the cases cited therein.
[40] H.R. Rep. No. 258, supra note 3, at 13.
[41] Even if the FRB were to change its position and hold that acquisition financing is not
subject to the margin regulations when the acquired shares will no longer be publicly held. such
change would not affect the first tender offer stage of the acquisition, which normally leaves a
significant number of public shares to be acquired in a subsequent transaction. The popularity and
prevalence of proration pools and multi-step acquisition techniques are discussed in L. Lederman
and P. Vlahakis, Pricingand Prorationin Tender Offers, 14 Rev. Sec. Reg. 813 (1981).
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